South Koreas System of Export Control on Strategic Items and Its Effective Enforcement Policy to Facilitate Economic Cooperation between South and North Korea by Choi, Seung Hwan
South Korea’s System of Export Control 
on Strategic Items and Its Effective Enforcement
Policy to Facilitate Economic Cooperation 
between South and North Korea 
Seung Hwan Choi*
* Professor of Public International Law and International Economic Law, College of Law/Graduate
School of International Legal Affairs, Kyung Hee University. B.A., LL.M. and J.S.D.(Seoul National
University); LL.M. & 2nd LL.M.(N.Y.U. School of Law). He is a member of Steering Committee of the
Strategic Trade Information Center (STIC), Korea International Trade Association (KITA). This article does




Because of the heightened concerns over terrorism and national security raised by the attacks of
September 11, 2001 in the United States (U.S.), multilateral export control regimes tightened export
controls of dual-use items for national security. Multilateral export control regimes initiated by the
U.S. seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons.
South Korea is a party to all relevant nonproliferation regimes (NSG, AG, MTCR) and the Wassenaar
Arrangement. South Korea introduced “Catch-all” controls to its export control system in January
2003, and established the Strategic Items Control Division (SICD) within the Ministry of Commerce,
Industry and Energy (MOCIE) in February 2004. In August 2004, the Strategic Trade Information
Center (STIC) opened as a nongovernmental organization to serve as a consultation or information
center regarding the export of strategic items and to assist private sector compliance with export
control regulations. South Korea’s export control regulations on strategic items include the Foreign
Trade Act (FTA: Articles 21, 54, 56, 58), Enforcement Decrees of FTA (Articles 39-45) and the Public
Notice of Export/Import (consisted of 68 Articles and 25 Annexes). They have been revised to reflect the
changes in the multilateral export control regimes, and apply to exports and re-exports of civilian and
dual use items (products, software, technology). Violations of the export control regulations may be
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I.  Introduction
In December 2004, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) opened the Kaesong Industrial Complex
in the city of Kaesong, North Korea, which is about 8 kilometers north of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). On December 15, 2004, stainless-steel pots, the first
products made by a kitchenware company “Living Art” at the Complex, were
shipped from the Complex to South Korea, and sold out at a department store in
Seoul.1)
The Kaesong Industrial Complex project has been considered a symbol of inter-
Korean reconciliation and is one of the significant inter-Korean projects as part of
Seoul’s “Sunshine policy” toward Pyongyang since the historic summit meeting
between the two held at Pyongyang in June 2000.2) Development of the Complex
created new momentum for increasing and enlarging inter-Korean trade. According
to a report “Trends of South-North Trade in January-July 2005” issued by the Korea
International Trade Association (KITA) in August 2005, South Korea exported US$
413.96 million worth of equipment and materials to North Korea in connection with
the project, while importing US$ 167.79 million worth of goods from the North.
Two-way trade in the first seven months of this year reached US$ 581.75 million, a
sharp rise of 55.5% compared with the same period in 2004.3)
Recently at the 10th round of the Committee Meeting for the Promotion of Inter-
Korean Economic Cooperation from July 9 to 12, 2005 in Seoul, South and North
Korea agreed i) to pursue economic cooperation projects in a new manner by
combining their economic elements such as resources, capital and technology so as
to achieve balanced development of the national economy, ii) to open an Office for
Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Consultation within the Kaesong Industrial
Complex in September 2005, iii) to swiftly construct infrastructural facilities
1) “Koreas Celebrate First Joint Venture Production,” The Korea Herald, December 16, 2004.
2) Other major inter-Korean projects under way include sightseeing tours to North Korea’s scenic Mt.
Geumgang and the reconnection of cross-border railways and roads that were severed just before the start of the
Korean War in June 1950.
3) KITA, “Trends of South-North Trade in January-July 2005,” August 23, 2005, available at
http://www.kita.net/top/state/n_submain_stat.jsp?menuId=07&subUrl=n_default-test.jsp?lang_gbn= kor^statid=
nks&top_menu_id=db11 (Last visited, August 30, 2005).
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subject to both criminal and civil penalties. Thus, South Korea has the legal and administrative systems
to comply with and implement multilateral export control regimes and the Security Council Resolution
1540 (on nonproliferation of WMD). Multilateral and national export control regimes have played an
important role to combat against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. However, multilateral and
national export control system may impede the expansion of economic cooperation between South and
North Korea. With a view to carrying out successfully economic cooperation with North Korea, a
strategy to enhance the effectiveness of export control system should be reviewed. In this context, this
article proposes some policies to administer effectively the export control system for successful
economic cooperation between South and North Korea.
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possible transfer of sensitive products and technologies, particularly in the areas of
information technology and machine tools, to North Korea.8) The United States
government officials have been concerned that the project could become a transit
point for the transfer of strategic items to North Korea. The South Korean
government selected 15 South Korean firms to participate in the pilot phase of the
three-phase project, but two companies could not receive authorization until late
January 2005, after the firms deleted sensitive items from their lists of materials that
the firms had been scheduled to transfer to the Complex.9)
As a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, South Korea is under an obligation
to prohibit exports or transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods that can be
converted into military use. Therefore, multilateral export control on strategic items
emerged as a major obstacle to the South-North economic cooperation. The issue of
export control on strategic items is very sensitive because it is also closely related to
the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. 
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce South Korea’s system of export
control on strategic items and propose an effective enforcement policy to facilitate
economic cooperation between South and North Korea. For this purpose, I will
briefly introduce the multilateral system of export control on strategic items (II), and
then review South Korea’s system of export control on strategic items (III). As for
South Korean businessmen, international and national system of export control on
strategic items may be a troublesome obstacle to the participation in the South-North
economic cooperation. In this context, this paper proposes some policies to
administer effectively the export control system for successful economic cooperation
between South and North Korea (IV).
8) En-Sun Kim, “Rocks at the Kaesong Complex Project,” Newsweek (Korean Edition), October 13, 2004, at.
61; “U.S. Blocking Kaesong Development Project,” The Korea Times, August 20, 2004 (pointing out that the real
reason for U.S. concerns is that the project will bring North Korea large sums of foreign capital).
9) “2004 in Review: Export Controls and Nonproliferation in East Asia,” Asian Export Control Observer
(December 2004/Janauary 2005), Issue 5, p. 5; Ji-Hyun Kim, “Korea Catches up with Strategic Goods Control,” The
Korea Herald, July 21, 2005 (reporting that the U.S. vetoed four Korean companies’ applications to commence
manufacturing at the Complex).
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necessary for the first stage development of the Complex covering 3.3 million
square meters so as to ensure provision of electricity, communications, industrial
water, etc., and iv) to take necessary steps to effectuate the already reached “nine
agreements”4) in order to ensure institutional framework for economic cooperation,
etc.5)
It is, thus, expected that economic cooperation combining South Korea’s capital
and technology with North Korea’s cheap labor and raw materials will be facilitated
more than ever,6) owing to the Kaesong Industrial Complex project and the South-
North Agreement at the 10th round of the Committee Meeting for the Promotion of
Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation. Among others, the low level of the minimum
monthly wage for the Complex (US$ 57.50 as against US $845), a corporate tax rate
half the South’s (14% as against 27%),7) and the high quality of the North Korean
workers will help small-and medium-sized South Korean businesses recover their
competitiveness. 
Economic cooperation has political as well as economic implications. Economic
cooperation between the two Koreas is expected to lay the foundation for peaceful
reunification of Korea by promoting peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving
mutual prosperity. The expansion of economic cooperation will ultimately lead to
the creation of an inter-Korean economic community. 
However, there are also obstacles to the success of the South-North economic
cooperation. The Kaesong Industrial Complex project has raised concerns over the
4) Nine Agreements on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation effectuated on August 15 are as follows: the Basic
Agreement on Operation of Vehicles on the Roads between the Two Koreas, the Agreement on Communications in
the Kaesong Industrial Complex Zone, the Agreement on Customs Clearance in the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Zone, the Agreement on Quarantine in the Kaesong Industrial Complex Zone, the Agreement on the Composition
and Operation of Inter-Korean Commercial Dispute Arbitration Committee, the Agreement on the Entry and Stay in
the Kaesong Industrial Complex Zone and Mt. Geumgang Tourism Zone, the Agreement on Rail Services between
the Two Koreas, the Agreement on Inter-Korean Maritime Transportation, the Supplementary Agreement on the
Implementation and Observation of the Agreement on Inter-Korean Maritime Transportation.
5) Agreement at the 10th Meeting of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, available
at http://www.mocie.go.kr (Last visited, June 25, 2005).
6) See KITA, “South-North Korea Trade Likely to Increase,” March 3, 2005, available at http://global.kita.net
(Last visited, August 30, 2005).
7) As to preferential tax provisions allied to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, see Kang-Taeg Lim & Sung-
Hoon Lim, Strategies for Development of a North Korean Special Economic Zone through Attracting Foreign
Investment (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), p. 51.
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The “no undercut” provisions under the four export control regimes require
member nations to provide information about exports they deny, as well as
notification when a member transfers products or technology that are essentially
identical to items denied by other nations.13) However, the four multilateral export
control regimes are not based on a legally binding international agreement, but
merely the voluntary political commitments of members to abide by their objectives
12) See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article XIV bis; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Article 73. 
13) Jamil Jaffer, “Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime,” 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 519 (2002), pp. 521-22.
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Table 1    Multilateral Export Control Regimes 
Source: Homepages of NSG, AG, MTCR, WA.
II.  Multilateral Export Control Regimes on Strategic Items
A. The Wassenaar Arrangement and Non-Proliferation Regime of WMD
Because of the heightened concerns over terrorism raised by the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. and multilateral export control regimes tightened
export controls of dual-use products and technology for national security. Dual-use
items are products or technology that are commercial or civil in nature but can be
used to produce dangerous weapons. Multilateral export control regimes seek to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear,
chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. 
The four principal regimes are the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies (WA)10); the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG); the Australia Group Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Control Regime (AG); the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). The U.S. and South Korea are members of all four regimes. The Export
Control Regulations of the U.S. and South Korea apply to exports of civilian and dual-
use products, software, and technology (see Table 1). Export controls for national
security may be justified as lawful under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 1994 (Article XXI)11) and the World Trade Organization Agreements.12)
10) In July 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement replaced the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) which had served as a multilateral export control body for forty-five years since 1949 but
terminated in March 1994 because of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of Cold War. 
11) GATT 1994, Article XXI (Security Exceptions) : 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to
its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
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control laws and regulations (para.3).
Under the Resolution, the Security Council establishes a Committee (“1540
Committee”), consisting of all its members, that is to receive reports from States on
their implementation of the Resolution and then report to the Council (para.4). The
Resolution called upon States: (a) to promote the universal adoption and full
implementation of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to
prevent the proliferation of WMD; (b) to adopt national rules and regulations, where
it has not yet been done, so as to ensure compliance with their commitments under
the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties; (c) to fulfill their commitment to
multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing
and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of
promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; (d) to develop
appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their
obligations under such laws (para.8).
The Resolution called upon States to present a first report no later than October
28, 2004 to the 1540 Committee. As of July 26, 2005, 120 countries, along with the
European Union, submitted national reports.16) South Korea’s national report,
submitted on October 27, 2004, emphasized that as a party to most of all relevant
treaties of international disarmament and nonproliferation and multilateral export
control regimes, South Korea had legal and administrative systems necessary to
ensure compliance with the Resolution and it would continue to complement and
develop those systems.17)
The Resolution 1540 marked a significant milestone in the development of
international law on the subject of WMD proliferation. It should be, however, noted
that the Resolution “calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal
authorities and legislations and consistent with international law, to take
cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons, their means of delivery, and related material.”(para.10: emphasis added)
16) But North Korea has not submitted. The national reports are available at http://disarmament2.un.org/
Committee1540/report.html (Last visited, August 25, 2005).
17) National Report of the Republic of Korea on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/24, p. 2.
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and rules, according to their own national laws and policies. The regimes operate on
the basis of consensus of all members and decisions on how to implement and
interpret regime decisions are left solely to the national discretion of member
governments.14) The consensus-based and voluntary nature of the regimes poses,
therefore, organizational and political obstacles to implementing reforms necessary
for the effective export control. In addition, the rapid pace of technological change
and growing supply of sensitive items from proliferators complicates keeping
control lists current, because these lists need to be updated more frequently.15)
B. Resolution 1540
On April 28, 2004, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council unanimously
adopted “Resolution 1540” drafted by the U.S. Invoking the Council’s power under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Resolution provides that “all States shall refrain
from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery.”(para.1) Further the Resolution
requires that “all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist
purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate
in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.”(para.2) It also requires all States
to develop and enforce domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation, such as
measures for accounting for and protecting WMD, for maintaining effective border
controls and law enforcement techniques, for controlling national exports and
transshipments, and for criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export
14) “Unlike COCOM, Wassenaar members do not have veto power over one another’s exports, do not have an
agreed-upon list of embargoed or restricted countries, and do not have a requirement for notification of exports to
shipment. The Wassenaar Arrangement merely requires an aggregate summary notification of listed exports after
transfer takes place, and a notice of license denials.” Christopher F. Corr, “The Wall Still Stands! Complying with
Export Controls on Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era,” 25 Hous. J. Int’l L. 441 (2003), p.
455. 
15) U.S. General Accounting Office, Non-Proliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export
Control Regimes (Report to Congressional Committees, October 2002), pp. 4, 22, 24, 27.
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legal obligations for participating States, but does represent a political commitment
to prevent or stop proliferation-related shipments.21)
The PSI means a shift in U.S. foreign policy towards a more flexible approach to
collective action that avoids both unilateralism and institutionalized multilateralism.
From the viewpoint of U.S., this approach would seem to offer a few advantages. It
may largely avoid problems of institutional blockage, such as those that can occur
within the U.N. Security Council; it allows for the limitation of new initiatives to
small groups of like-minded States, with the group then being expanded once
momentum has been achieved; and it enables the U.S. to focus its persuasive efforts
on those most able and willing to cooperate with respect to non-proliferation.22)
Conflicts of interests among powerful countries such as Russia and China may,
however, limit its effectiveness and cause unnecessary disputes in international
affairs.23) Although the PSI is global in nature, it is largely directed at North Korea.24)
South Korea and Japan have thus expressed apprehensions that the hard line being
taken by the U.S. could provoke North Korea. North Korea has repeatedly stated
that any interdiction of its vessels or aircraft would be regarded as an act of war and
that it would react accordingly.25)
21) John R. Bolton, “The Bush Administration’s Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation,” 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 395
(2005), p. 400.
22) Michael Byers, supra note 19, p. 544.
23) Russia recently joined PSI.
24) In April, 2003, the U.S. intercepted aluminum tubes (key components of high-speed centrifuges used to
manufacture highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons) likely bound for North Korea. A combined French and
German effort also intercepted sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. John
Harrington, “Arms Control and National Security,” 38 Int’l Law. 391 (2004), pp. 393-94. See Testimony of John R.
Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, to the Committee on International Relations,
U.S. House of Representatives, June 4, 2003, available at http://www.house.gov/ international_relations/
108/bolt0604.htm (Last visited, June 25, 2005).
25) “North Korea Up In Arms,” The Washington Times, August 14, 2003. With respect to the legality in
international law of the PSI, see Benjamin Friedman, “The Proliferation Initiative: The Legal Challenge” (Bipartisan
Security Group, Sep. 4, 2003), pp. 2-9, available at http://www.gsinstitute.org/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf (Last
visited, August 30, 2005).)
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 5, No.1, 2005
105
Thus the Resolution is merely an invitation from the Council to States to cooperate
in efforts to combat WMD proliferation in a manner consistent with existing
domestic and international laws.18)
C. The Proliferation Security Initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multilateral effort to stop the
shipment and transportation of WMD. Announced by President Bush on May 31,
2003, in Krakow, Poland, the goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic and
proactive approach to preventing proliferation of WMD. Eleven countries initially
joined the PSI and,19) on September 4, 2003, adopted a “Statement of Interdiction
Principles.”
Under the Interdiction Principles, PSI participants committed to establish more
coordinated and effective measures through which to stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-State
actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant
international law and frameworks, including the U.N. Security Council. Apart from
not trafficking in missiles and WMD themselves, these measures include
cooperating in the search and seizure of suspect vessels that are flying their own
flags, searching and stopping suspect foreign vessels that enter their ports, providing
consent to the boarding and searching of a State’s own flag vessels by other States,
denying transit rights to suspect aircraft, and requiring any such planes that do enter
its airspace to land for inspection.20)
However, the PSI is not based on a formal international agreement, but a set of
activities. It is best understood as a set of partnerships that provides the basis for
cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal
18) Daniel H. Joyner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and
International Law,” 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 507 (2005), p. 541.
19) They were Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and U.S. In the fall of 2003, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, and Turkey participated in PSI meetings. Some
sixty other countries have reportedly agreed to cooperate on an ad hoc basis if a suspect ship or aircraft enters their
territorial waters or airspace. Michael Byers, “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative,” 98
A.J.I.L. 526 (2004), p. 529. 
20) U.S. Department of State, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles,” Sept.
4, 2003, available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/ris/fs/23764.htm (Last visited, August 30, 2005).
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3. Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) takes charge of approving the export of
strategic items such as military products (arms, weapons, munitions).  
4. Korea Customs Service
The Korea Customs Service, dealing with tariff tasks related to imports and
exports, has the authority to inspect and restrict the export of strategic items. The
customs officers can inspect inbound and outbound or return goods.
5. Ministry of Unification
The Ministry of Unification (MOU) is responsible for controlling strategic items
related to the trade between South and North Korea.28) It also establishes and
administers policies on the exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas and
carries out education and promotion for the national reunification of the Korean
Peninsula. 
6. Strategic Items Trade Information Center 
The Strategic Items Trade Information Center (STIC) was established in August
2004 under the supervision of the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) to
provide sufficient information on the trade of strategic items and perform related
tasks more efficiently. Its major activities include determining whether a specific
product or technology falls under the category of strategic items, promoting export
controls on strategic items, fostering international cooperation and exchanges,
offering consultation or information regarding the export of strategic items,
developing export control guidelines including parameter sheets, helping businesses
28) Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, Article 13.1: If any trading party desires to take out, or bring
in goods, he shall obtain the license of the Minister for National Unification on goods, form of trade, and the price
settlement method, under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree. The same shall apply in cases he
desires to modify any important matters as prescribed by the Presidential Decree among from those matters for
which a license has been issued.
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III.  South Korea’s System of Export Control on Strategic Items
A. Export Control Authorities
1. Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy
The Trade Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and
Energy (MOCIE) used to control COCOM items beginning in 1989. When the
department was closed in 1998, however, the Import Division of the Ministry
undertook the task of controlling strategic items. With a view to improving the
effectiveness of export control on strategic items, MOCIE established the Strategic
Items Control Division (SICD) in February 2004. SICD carries out comprehensive
functions such as controlling strategic items (mainly industrial products) and
administering export control regulations. In other words, SICD not only formulates
policies on strategic items but also approves companies to export strategic items and
performs tasks related to the management of the organization handling evaluation. 
On February 17, 2005, MOCIE launched an online database system to help
exporters determine whether their products are classified as strategic items and
subject to Korea’s export control regulations. The Strategic Item Export Control
Information System was designed to allow registered users easy access to
information and thereby increase the efficiency and accuracy of export control
regulations.26) By utilizing a specialized search engine, Korean companies are now
able to request and receive approvals for exports online, minimizing administrative
paperwork and reducing the amount of time required to get export licenses.27)
2. Ministry of Science and Technology 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) controls atomic reactors, their
components and related technologies. In case only technology is exported, MOST is
the export license authority. 
26) The Strategic Item Export Control Information System based on the Foreign Trade Act (Article 21 bis) is
now available at http://www.sec.go.kr (Last visited, August 25, 2005).
27) “South Korea Launches Online Database for Strategic Items Exports,” Asian Export Control Observer
(February/March 2005), Issue 6, p. 2.
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technology listed in Annexes 2-7 of the Public Notice of Export/Import and its
export control is deemed necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security as well as national security. “1st Class Strategic Items” are those listed in
Annex 2 (items related to the Wassenaar Arrangement), Annex 3 (items related to
Non-Proliferation of Atomic Energy), Annex 4 (items related to Non-Proliferation of
Missiles), Annex 5 (items related to Non-Proliferation of Biochemical Weapons),
Annex 6 (items related to Chemical Weapons Convention) of the Public Notice of
Export/Import. “2nd Class Strategic Items” are those listed under double-digit HS
code (No.25-40, 54-59, 63, 68-93, and 95) in Annex 7 (2nd Class Strategic Items
related to the Catch-all) of the Public Notice of Export/Import that are included as
export control items as the new system of Catch-all commenced as of January 1,
2003.33)
If anyone makes use of the “HSK connection table” developed by MOCIE, even
non-experts can easily find out items belonging to 1st Class Strategic Items by
simply searching for the appropriate HS Code. In case of 2nd Class Strategic Items,
the Public Notice of Export/Import provides the objective standards used in making
determinations on whether an importer is connected to development of WMD.34)
In the case of items related to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the covered items are
those agreed in the plenary meeting and are divided into two types of items: general
industry items and defense industry items. “General industry items” are dual use
items belonging to higher technologies that can be transformed as items for the
defense industry. “Defense industry items” are those for direct military use such as
33) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 2. Korea had adopted the Catch-all system when it revised the
Public Notice of Export and Import of Strategic Items on December 24, 2002 in order to comply with non-
proliferation regimes of WMD in the world community.
34) Article 20.2: When exporting 2nd Class Strategic Items, the trader and his/her representative must request
for individual export approval from the head of the export approval agency as stipulated in Article 3 under any of the
following cases: 1. If the importer or end user (hereinafter, refer to as “end user”) intends to use the 2nd class
strategic items in the manufacture, use, and storage of weapons of mass destruction as clearly indicated in the
document, drawing, or electronic document (hereinafter, refer to as “document”) acquired by the trader and his/her
representative for the export of 2nd grade strategic items; 2. If the 2nd class strategic items are installed or used in
areas where utmost secrecy is required, such as areas with military facilities or areas that are near military facilities,
and if the use of the goods in question is believed to be doubtful; 3. If the trader and his/her representative believe
that the end user intends to use the imported 2nd class strategic items in the manufacture, development, use, and
storage of weapons of mass destruction considering the conditions and nature of the export transaction; 4. If the head
of the strategic item export approval agency grants permission to export strategic items as stipulated in Article 3. 
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establish compliance programs (CPs) and carrying out researches of domestic and
overseas policies and regulations on strategic items. STIC also operates a portal
system that provides comprehensive support related to export controls including on-
line procedures for determination and export licenses.29)
B. Laws and Regulations for Export Control on Strategic Items
South Korea’s system of export control on strategic items was introduced by the
enactment of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act (FTA) and the
Regulation of Foreign Trade Management with a view to implementing domestically
the “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of
Korea and the Government of the United States on the Protection of Strategic
Commodities and Technical Data” (hereinafter referred to as the “Korea-U.S.
MOU”) which was concluded on September 11, 1987.30) South Korea’s export
control on strategic items has been administered since July 1, 1993, according to
FTA and its Enforcement Decree as well as the Public Notice on Export and Import
of Strategic Items.31) The major contents of FTA, the Enforcement Decree of FTA,
and the Unified Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items and
Technology (hereinafter referred to as the “Public Notice of Export/Import”) enacted
in December 2004, and revised in February, 2005, are as follows: 
1. Covered Items
The scope of strategic materials controlled by FTA is almost the same as the
export restriction items under the Wassenaar Arrangement and Non-Proliferation
Regime of WMD. The Public Notice of Export/Import provided a separate system
for export control on strategic items by classifying them into “1st Class Strategic
Items” and “2nd Class Strategic Items.”32) “Strategic items” here refer to products or
commodities (materials, facilities and equipments, components), software, and
29) See http://stic.kita.net (Last visited, August 30, 2005).
30) The Korea-US MOU put into force on May 11, 1989.
31) Korean Laws related to export control on strategic items include the Technology Development Promotion
Act, the Atomic Energy Act, Act on Special Measures for Defense Industry, the Act on the Control of the
Production, Export, Import, etc. of Specific Chemicals for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, etc.
32) Enforcement Decree of FTA, Article 39.1.
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rifles, fighter airplanes, missiles, etc.
However, all items mentioned above are not automatically controlled but only in
relation to certain items that exceed the specific level of technology standards.
According to the Korea-U.S. MOU, the scope of strategic items to be controlled is
determined by mutual consultations.35)
2. Countries and Geographic Areas Covered
Exports of strategic items to “countries and geographic areas deemed dangerous
for the international peace and the security” are controlled differently according to
the destination. There are two types of areas where exports of strategic items are
approved or restricted: “Area A” and “Area B.” The level of export control is
different according to the area or destination and types of strategic items. Thus the
Public Notice of Export/Import differentiated the export approval procedures
according to the types of strategic items and export areas in order to improve
efficiently the system of export control and to lessen the burdens on Korean traders. 
Countries belonging to geographic area “A” are member countries of the four
multilateral export control system of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Non-Proliferation
of Atomic Energy, Non-Proliferation of Biochemical Weapons, and Non-
Proliferation of Missiles. The division of export areas is based on the final
destination of strategic items. When the export of a strategic item is destined for
geographic area “A” via area “B,” the item is considered to be exported to
geographic area “B.”36) It should be noted that North Korea is classified as
geographic area “B” only when strategic items are re-exported to North Korea via
the third country (see Table 2).37)
3. Export License Authorities
The export license of general industry items under the Wassenaar Arrangement,
general industry items related to the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Energy, items
related to the Non-Proliferation of Missiles, items related to the Non-Proliferation of
Biochemical and Chemical Weapons (Schedule 1, Schedule 2 & Schedule 3) are
issued by SICD within the MOCIE. The export of 2nd Class Strategic Items is also
licensed by SICD.38)
The export license of defense industry items under the Wassenaar Arrangement is
issued by the Department of International Cooperation within MOD. The export of
general industry items under the Wassenaar Arrangement, missiles and biochemical
and chemical weapons is also licensed by the Department of International
Cooperation if the importer’s purpose is for military use. MOST issues export
license to traders exporting only technology out of 1st Class Strategic Items and
items used only for atomic energy. The export of technology related to 2nd Class
Strategic Items is also licensed by MOST. When exporting products and software
36) See Annex 9 (Division of Areas of Export Control).
37) South and North Korea do not impose tariffs on goods exchanged between themselves, and the economic
transactions between South and North Korea are not considered as foreign trade, but as intra-Korean commerce. See
Protocol on the Implementation and Observance of Chapter 3, South-North Exchanges and Cooperation, of the
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, adopted on September 17, 1992,
Article 1.10.
38) However, the export of organic and inorganic compounds of radioactive isotopes and atomic reactors and
their components that belong to 2nd class strategic items is licensed by MST (Public Notice of Export/Import,
Article 3.1).
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35) Korea-U.S. MOU, Para. II-1.
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Table 2    Area of Export Control 
Source: Public Notice of Export/Import, Annex 9. 




Bulgaria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, England, the
United States (Total: 28 countries)
Export license need
not be requested, but
a report of export
transactions has to be
submitted




North Korea (only in case of being
re-exported to North Korea via 3rd
country), Iran, Iraq, India, Libya,
Israel, North Korea, China, Russia,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, etc.
(Country or area which does not
belong to Area A)
Export license has to
be requested
Export license has to
be requested only if the
importer or end user
meets the requirements




In principle, the strategic item determination authority has to make a positive or
negative ruling, within 15 days of the receipt of applications, for preliminary
determination of whether the item falls under 1st Class Strategic Items. In case a
separate deliberation is required, however, the deadline for the ruling may be
extended.45) In case of a “negative ruling” or “not applicable ruling,” the strategic
item determination authority must issue a corresponding certificate to the applicant
or his representative.46)
When exporting the products in question with “positive ruling” or “applicable
ruling” to area “B,” the exporter or his representative must get an export license
from the export license authority. On the contrary, when exporting to area “A,” the
exporter or his representative is not required to get export license but has to submit a
report of export transactions to the export license authority.47) The products with
“negative ruling” may be exported without the export license. The validity term of
the determination ruling is 1 year from the date when the ruling was announced.48)
5. Export License Procedures
When exporting 1st Class Strategic Items to area “B,” the exporter or their
representative must request an export license (EL) from the export license authority.
There are two different types of export licenses: “individual export license” (IEL) for
the individual export of strategic items and “comprehensive export license” (CEL)
for a particular item and for a certain period.49)
When exporting 2nd Class Strategic Items to area “B’, the trader or their
representative must request for individual export license under the following cases:
i) If the importer or end user (hereinafter referred to as “end user”) intends to use the
2nd Class Strategic Items in the manufacture, use, and storage of WMD as clearly
indicated in the document, drawing, or electronic document acquired by the trader
44) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 4.1.
45) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 8.1.
46) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 8.2.
47) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 9.1.
48) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 9.3.
49) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 13.1.
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belonging to strategic items, an export license should be obtained for the products
from the export license authority provided at Annex 8 of the Public Notice of
Export/Import. When exporting technologies together with the products and
software, an export license should be obtained for the products and software from
the export license authority provided at Annex 8. On the other hand, those who want
to export only the technology related to military weapons and products must first
obtain recommendation from MOD before requesting for export license from
MOST.39) The head of the export license authority must consult with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade first if the license of a strategic item is deemed to have
serious impact on the nation’s security or foreign policy.40)
In case of inter-Korean commerce, MOU approves the direct transfer of strategic
items to North Korea. Since MOU lacks technical capability to review the possibility
of military diversion, it may request a determination of strategic items to MOCIE,
and afterward decide whether or not to issue export license to applicants, based on
the results of the determination by MOCIE. MOU announces in the form of a Public
Notice the lists of covered items that are subject to the export license.41)
4. Preliminary Determination
It is the exporter who makes a determination whether items for export fall under
1st Class Strategic Items.42) Exporters or manufacturers who are not sure whether
their products fall under 1st Class Strategic Items may request a determination from
the export license authority by submitting 2 copies of the determination application
form with relevant documents.43)
As to the strategic item determination authority, Article 3 of the Public Notice of
Export/Import, in general, applies. However, so long as the determination of
strategic items falling under the jurisdiction of MOCIE is concerned, the Strategic
Items Trade Information Center (STIC) of KITA is in charge of preliminary
determination, according to Article 53.1 of FTA and Article 116 of the Enforcement
39) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 3.
40) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 15.1.
41) See Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, Article 14.
42) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 6.1.
43) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 7.1.
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license authority may attach conditions as necessary.56) The export license authority
may terminate or cancel the validity of an export license in any of the following
cases: i) the strategic items with export license are likely to be transferred to export-
restricted areas in violation of the regulation; ii) when the head of the export license
authority deems it necessary to cancel export licenses for security reasons or new
changes in international affairs that occurred after issuing them.57)
The validity term of an individual export license is one year in principle.58) An
export license can be exempted when certain requirements are satisfied.59) However,
an exporter must submit a report of export transactions to the export license
authority with 7 days of exporting the items.60)
In the case of a comprehensive export license, there are three different categories:
The first is “general comprehensive export license” which allows the trader to export
a particular item to area “A” for a certain period; the second is “special
comprehensive export license” which allows the trader to export a particular item for
a certain period to the same importer who has purchased from the exporter more
than three times in the past two years; and the third is “commissioned processing
comprehensive export license” which allows the trader to export for a certain period
when the trader manufactures items under a commissioned processing contract and
re-export them to a destination designated by the consignor within a certain period.61)
The export license authority must decide whether to approve the application for
comprehensive export within 42 days from the receipt of applications.62) The validity
term of a general comprehensive export license is two years, while that of a special
comprehensive export is one year. On the other hand, the validity term of a
56) Enforcement Decree of FTA, Article 39.3; Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 23.
57 Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 27.1.
58) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 25.
59) For example, export license is not necessary in any of the following cases: i) Shipbuilding equipment or
airplane supplies used for foreign shipping or airplanes within the territory of South Korea; ii) when exporting
machine, equipment, and component used for emergency repair, without compensation, for the safe operation of
ships or airplanes; iii) overseas diplomatic missions (including a foreign branch of the Korea Trade Investment
Promotion Agency), Korean troops dispatched overseas, or public property sent for diplomatic mission; iv) freights
and products sent to international institutions, which do not require export license according to the treaty or
international commitment (Public Notice of Import/Export, Article 26.1).
60) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 26.1.
61) Public Notice of Export/Import, Articles 32, 33, 34.
62) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 34.1.
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and his representative for the export of 2nd Class Strategic Items; ii) if 2nd Class
Strategic Items are installed or used in areas where utmost secrecy is required, such
as areas with military facilities or areas that are near military facilities, and if the use
of the goods in question is believed to be doubtful; iii) if the trader and his
representative believe that the end user intends to use the imported 2nd Class
Strategic Items in the manufacture, development, use, and storage of WMD
considering the conditions and nature of the export transaction; iv) if the trader and
his representative are notified to apply for an export license from the export license
authority.50)
The export and re-export of 1st Class Strategic Items is, in principle, approved
only when they are used for peaceful purposes.51) The Public Notice of
Export/Import stipulates specifically principles and guidelines for export control
according to the types of strategic items.52) The export license authority issues export
licenses after deliberating the following: i) whether the export products belong to
strategic items or not; ii) importing country of the products in question; iii) technical
level and military and diplomatic sensibility of the products, iv) whether the
products shall be used in the private sector; v) the importer, final receiver, and end
user and the credibility of end use confirmed by the end user; vi) possibility of
transfer of the products to export-restricted areas; vii) whether the exporter, importer,
final receiver or end user of the products is disqualified for trading strategic
materials.53) If the export license of strategic items is deemed to have serious effects
on the nation’s security or foreign policy, the head of the export license authority
must consult in advance with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.54)
In the case of an individual export license,55) the export license authority must
issue an export license (with a license number attached) or reject to issue it, within
15 days from the receipt of applications. When issuing export licenses, the export
50) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 20.2.
51) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 16.1.
52) See Public Notice of Export/Import, Articles 16, 17.
53) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 22.1.
54) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 15.1.
55) Individual export license refers to the approval granted by the export license authority regarding the
application for the individual export of strategic items and export of items with confirmed volumes (Public Notice of
Export/Import, Article 18).
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of the trader to refuse export transactions after deliberation based on the operation
rules of strategic item export management (“Voluntary Export Administration
Regulations”) prepared by an independent export transaction deliberation body
(“Voluntary Export Administration Body”). It also refers to certain procedures or
systems that can support applications for preliminary determination of strategic
items and export licenses filed with MOCIE and the head of the administrative
institution concerned.67) 
In consideration of the importance of voluntary export control in international
transactions, the Public Notice of Export/Import introduced a designation system of
“voluntary compliance traders”68) and provided business entities abiding by their
internal voluntary compliance system with special privileges by designating them as
voluntary compliance traders. Voluntary compliance traders must regularly report to
MOCIE, production and export performance of strategic items, operating status of
the voluntary compliance system, etc.69)
On the other hand, voluntary compliance traders are exempted from applying for
individual export licenses in their export of 1st Class Strategic Items, and simply
required to submit a report of export transaction of strategic items, within 7 days of
exporting 1st Class Strategic Items, to the export license authority.70) They are also
entitled to apply for a comprehensive export license.71)
8. Penalties 
FTA has reinforced penal provisions for the violation of laws and regulations on
export control. Anyone who has obtained or attempted to obtain export licenses of
strategic items in fraudulent or unjustifiable means, or who has exported or
attempted to export strategic items without export licenses to an area in which such
export is restricted and which is publicly announced by MOCIE shall be punished by
imprisonment for less than five years, or by a fine not exceeding three times of the
67) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 55.
68) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 58.
69) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 60.
70) On the contrary, the traders not designated as voluntary compliance traders must submit the report within 3
days of reporting the export transaction of strategic items (Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 19.3).
71) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 30.2.
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commissioned processing comprehensive export license is three years.63)
The purpose of a comprehensive export license is to allow business entities with
a voluntary compliance system to export for a certain period by exempting
individual export licenses, and thus to induce voluntary export control on the part of
civilian business entities by simplifying export procedures. For non-strategic items,
the above procedures are not required. When it is doubtful whether their products are
strategic items or not, traders may apply for determination from the export license
authority, with relevant documents.
6. Re-export License
The trader who wants to re-export the imported strategic items to a foreign
country must obtain a re-export license from the export license authority. The
procedures and requirements for re-export license are the same as those for an export
license.64)
However, re-exporting licenses are not necessary, if the imported strategic items
that are manufactured and processed using components are not considered strategic
items and subject to the following conditions: i) if the value of the imported strategic
items is less than 25% of the total price of goods (however, when Syria, Iran, Cuba,
Sudan, and North Korea is the destination, less than 10%); ii) if it is impossible to
separate the strategic items from the goods for export, or the original function of the
goods is no longer detectable.65)
7. Voluntary Compliance System
The Public Notice of Export/Import named the internal export management
system carried out voluntarily by domestic companies “voluntary compliance
system,” and articulated “Model Voluntary Export Administration Regulations”66)
that could be referred to as a guideline for business entities in performing their
voluntary export control. Here, “voluntary compliance system” refers to the option
63) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 35.
64) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 38.
65) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 39.
66) See Public Notice of Export/Import, Annex 11. 
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project to North Korea. Since the revitalization of economic cooperation between
South and North Korea may contribute to the acceleration of reconciliation and
prosperity, the establishment of an inter-Korean economic community, and the
peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, it is very important to find out appropriate
means to facilitate the economic cooperation by operating successfully the project
without jeopardizing the purpose of export control on strategic items.   
A. Enhancement of Flexible Interpretation of Strategic Items
Export control on strategic items is designed for maintaining international peace
and security and protecting national security. However, it can cause international
disputes in connection with its legality as to economic coercion or intervention in
sovereign States, if States concerned do not have the same views on the strategic
evaluation of certain items.
In general, products affecting national security considerably may be considered
strategic items. In this case, the “degree of effects on national security” may be a
criterion for determining strategic items. Issues of national security occur when
substantial national interests are threatened by negative actions or factors from
outside. Traditionally, political independence and territorial integrity have been
considered major factors affecting national security. With a view to preventing the
abuse of export control on strategic items, stricter interpretation of national security
is required. However, the concept of national security may be not clearly defined,
and also there is no international agreement on the concept and scope of national
security.
If strategic items are defined too widely, all industrial products that can be used
for military purpose may be subject to export control, and this practically will block
up the Kaesong Industrial Complex project and economic cooperation between
South and North Korea. Since strategic items are those that can imperil international
peace and security, it is more reasonable to exclude items not endangering
international peace and security from the list of export control. Since the economic
cooperation may lay the foundation for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas by
accelerating amicable reconciliation and cooperation, more “flexible interpretation”
is required as to the determination of strategic items. In particular, it is necessary to
utilize positively Article 16 of the Public Notice of Export/Import that, in principle,
allows export and re-export of strategic items “only for the purpose of peaceful use.” 
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value of exported items.72) It should be noted that there were two recent cases where
Korean companies were charged for violation of export control regulations.73)
Any representative of a legal person and its agent as well as the principal
offender who have obtained or attempted to obtain export licenses for strategic items
by fraudulent or unjustifiable means shall be punished in respect of functions of the
legal person or the individual.74)
The Minister of MOCIE may prohibit export or import of strategic items for less
than one year by designating them as a “disqualified party for trading strategic
items,” for those who violated the provision of export license of strategic items
under FTA (Article 21) or those who disturbed the international trade order
regarding export and import of strategic items and those deemed as deserving of the
sanctions for trading strategic items by MOCIE. The Minister of MOCIE may
prohibit the trader from exporting or importing strategic items overseas, in the case
of corresponding trade restrictions under the laws of the foreign country
concerned.75)
IV. Administration of Export Control System for the Successful
Economic Cooperation between South and North Korea:
Policy Proposals
The multilateral and national export control regimes on strategic items and non-
proliferation regimes of WMD may block up the successful operation of the
Kaesong Industrial Complex project, and thus make it impossible or difficult for the
Korean companies to transfer products and technologies necessary for operating the
72) FTA, Articles 54, 56; Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 65.1.
73) Both cases were related to the re-export of sodium cyanide. The Korean government could withhold the
products from export and ordered the companies to redeem the sodium cyanide in question. Having found forgery
and negligence of the companies, the Korean authorities brought the companies to trial. Sun-Jin Lee, “To Prevent
WMD Falling into Wrong Hands,” The Korea Herald, June 17, 2004, at 13; In February 2004, MOCIE filed a legal
complaint against a Korean company after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered Korean-
made balancing machines, which can be used to balance uranium enrichment centrifuges, in Libya. “2004 in
Review: Export Controls and Nonproliferation in East Asia,” supra note 9, p.15. 
74) FTA, Article 58 (Joint Penal Provisions).
75) Enforcement Decree for FTA, Article 45; Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 64.
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the internet for self-determination of strategic items, applications for export licenses,
recording-keeping and information sharing; to recruit specialists on export control
and train the personnel in charge of export control administration; to provide
incentives to the companies that maintain voluntary compliance system. 
C. Systematic Mechanism for Preventing Diversion to Military Use
The reason for reinforcing export control to North Korea is that the industrial
products transferred to North Korea can be converted into defensive equipments for
military use. In particular, the U.S. government has been very much concerned that
strategic items transferred to North Korea may be used for developing WMD. It is
necessary to supply promptly and continuously products and technology needed for
projects and business, in order to ensure the successful operation of those projects
and to facilitate economic cooperation between South and North Korea. It is also
necessary to establish a systematic safety net in order to prevent the conversion of
supplied products into strategic items for military use and remove the concerns of
the U.S. government as to the conversion of transferred products into military use.
There is no justification for the U.S. government to reject the transfer of strategic
items to North Korea, if it is ensured that transferred items are used “only for
peaceful purpose.”  
Policy proposals for preventing exports from being converted into military use
may be summarized as follows: to declare publicly that the products supplied for
economic cooperation between South and North Korea shall be used only for
peaceful purposes; to establish a system where the U.S.A. or a third country may at
any time confirm whether the products are used only for peaceful purposes; to attach
the “radio frequency identification device/system”79) (RFID) on the products; and to
make a joint declaration or an agreement to secure peaceful use of transferred
products. North Korea should cooperate fully in developing the transparent and
trustworthy administration system which ensures that the products transferred to
North Korea are not to be used for military purposes, instead of complaining about
the export control on strategic items. 
79) The RFID is a method of remotely storing and retrieving data using devices called RFID tags/transponders.
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Accordingly, it is necessary to apply flexibly the criteria for evaluating strategic
items, with respect to the products transferred to North Korea for economic
cooperation between South and North Korea. For example, factors such as “non
military use of products,” “purpose of business,” “foundation of infrastructure for
peaceful reunification” may be taken into consideration in determining the scope of
strategic items. More relaxed criteria should be applied or adopted to the products
transferred to specific areas appointed as special economic zone (SEZ) such as the
Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
In particular, the Minister of MOU should apply more flexible interpretation on
the scope of strategic items, in connection with economic cooperation between
South and North Korea, in due considerations of reconciliation and cooperation for
mutual prosperity, and the achievement of peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.
B. Expeditious Determination on Strategic Items
Expeditious determination of whether certain products or technologies fall under
strategic items or not is required with a view to controlling effectively the export of
strategic items. The Public Notice of Export/Import has increased the efficiency and
expedition of the determination on strategic items by introducing a preliminary
determination system. In principle, the strategic item determination authority has to
make a positive or negative ruling, within 15 days of the receipt of applications, for
the preliminary determination of whether certain products fall under 1st Class
Strategic Items.76) The “Model Voluntary Export Administration Regulations”77)
improved the voluntary compliance system by providing companies with specific
guidelines, and the Public Notice of Export/Import introduced a designation system
of voluntary compliance traders to simplify the export license procedures of strategic
items.78)
Policy proposals for expediting the determination process of strategic items may
be summarized as follows: to enhance transparency of the export license procedures
by publishing concrete criteria for evaluating strategic items; to establish the export
administration system of strategic items that provide clear and simple research on
76) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 8.1.
77) Public Notice of Export/Import, Annex 11.
78) Public Notice of Export/Import, Article 58.
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Foreign availability is a practical and effective system because it may minimize
the impairment of national security by illegal export of strategic items and maximize
the benefits to the national economy and business by promoting the free trade of
industrial products. It is strongly recommended for the Korean government to
introduce foreign availability provisions in the FTA to prevent conflict with the U.S.
government requesting strict export control on strategic items to North Korea and
facilitate economic cooperation between South and North Korea. 
E. Close Consultation between South Korea and the U.S.
Under the Korea-U.S. MOU, the list of strategic items to be controlled by Korea
is due to be determined by consultations with U.S.85) In addition, South Korea
undertook not to permit re-export of U.S.-origin controlled strategic items which
have been imported into South Korea without verifying that written approval of U.S.
has been obtained, when such approval is required.86)
The U.S. prohibits the shipment of strategic items, without export licenses, to
countries considered to be supporting terrorism (North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Libya,
Sudan and Syria), if those products are made in U.S. or more than 10% of their
components are sourced from the U.S.87) In this context, on November 17, 2005, KT
Corp., Korea’s largest fixed-line telephone and broadband internet supplier,
succeeded in obtaining the U.S. approval for telecommunications equipment that it
plans to install in the Kaesong Industrial Complex.88) Thus, the approval will pave
the way for KT to provide telecom services to Korean firms operating in the
Complex.     
Since the penalty under the EAR may do considerable damage on the Korean
companies doing business in the Complex,89) close consultation between South
85) The Korea-U.S. MOU, Para. II-1.
86) The Korea-U.S. MOU, Para. II-4.
87) 15 C.F.R. �734.4(c).
88) “KT to ship telecom gear to Gaeseong,” The Korea Herald, 18 November, 2005. KT agreed to set the
landline phone charge at 40 U.S. cents a minute last March, a considerable drop in price compared to the current
$2.3 per minute. “Seoul-Kaesong Telephone Link-Ups Will Open This Year,” The Korea Times, 17 November,
2005.
89) Under the EAR, it is a violation to “engage in any conduct prohibited by or contrary to, or refrain from
engaging in any conduct required by the EAA, the EAR, or any order, license, or authorization issued
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D. Utilization of the Rule of Foreign Availability
If a covered State can import or obtain strategic items from third countries
without any difficulty, it will be ineffective or unreasonable to prohibit strategic
items from being exported to the State. Unilateral export control not based on
international cooperation will only cause economic loss to domestic companies
within the regulating State. Therefore, a more flexible policy to exclude certain
items with foreign availability from the export control list is required, so long as
North Korea can easily import or obtain the items from third countries.
It is necessary to utilize to the full extent the system of foreign availability under
the U.S. regulations in order to minimize the negative effect of export control on
strategic items with respect to economic cooperation between South and North
Korea. Under the U.S. “Export Administration Regulation” (EAR), foreign
availability exists when the Secretary of Commerce determines that an item is
“comparable in quality”80) to an item subject to U.S. national security export controls,
and is “available in fact”81) to a country, from a non-U.S. source, in “sufficient
quantities”82) to render the U.S. export control of that item or the denial of a license
ineffective. For a controlled country, such control or denial is ineffective when
maintaining such control or denying a specific license would not restrict the
availability of items that would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of the controlled country or combination of countries detrimental to the
national security of the U.S.83) If the Secretary determines that foreign availability
exists, the Secretary may cancel export control or approve the license in question if
there is no foreign policy reason to deny the license, unless the President decides it is
harmful for national security.84)
80) An item is of “comparable quality” to an item controlled under the EAR if it possesses the characteristics
specified in the Commerce Control List (CCL) for that item and is alike in key characteristics that include, but are
not limited to: (1) function; (2) technological approach; (3) performance thresholds; (4) maintainability and service
life; and (5) any other attribute relevant to the purpose for which the control was placed on the item. 15 C.F.R.�768.1(d).
81) An item is “available-in-fact” to a country if it is produced within the country or if it may be obtained by
that country from a third country. 15 C.F.R.�768.1(d).
82) “Sufficient quantities” means the amount of an item that would render the U.S. export control, or the denial
of the license in question, ineffective in achieving its purpose. 15 C.F.R.�768.1(d). 
83) 15 C.F.R.�768.2(a).
84) 15 C.F.R.�768.3(a).
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North Korea, a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of export control system should
be reviewed. In this context, this article proposed the articulation of transparent and
explicit criteria for evaluating dual-use, the development of mechanisms for
preventing diversion to military use, a flexible interpretation of dual-use items in
consideration of foreign availability, and close consultation between South Korea
and the U.S.
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Korea and the U.S. is very important for the successful operation of the Complex.
The scope of coverage of the EAR is extremely broad. The scope includes the
following: (1) all commodities, technology, and software in the U.S.; (2) all U.S.
origin commodities, technology, and software wherever situated; (3) U.S. origin
parts, components, materials or other commodities integrated abroad into foreign-
made products, U.S. origin software commingled with foreign software, U.S. origin
technology commingled with foreign software, respectively, in quantities exceeding
de minimis levels; (4) certain foreign-made direct products based on U.S. origin
technology and software when shipped to certain destinations.90)
V.  Conclusion
Export control on strategic items is indispensable for national security as well as
international peace and security. Multilateral and national export control regimes are
a key policy tool to combat against terrorism and prevent the proliferation of WMD.
In response to the heightened concerns over terrorism and national security raised by
the attacks of September 11, 2001, South Korea as well as other States participating
in multilateral export control regimes tightened export controls on dual-use items.
However, multilateral and national export control systems may block up the
successful operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex project, and impede the
expansion of economic cooperation between South and North Korea. It should be
noted that the revitalization of the economic cooperation may contribute to the
acceleration of reconciliation and prosperity, and the peaceful reunification of the
two Koreas. With a view to carrying out successfully economic cooperation with
thereunder.”(15 C.F.R. �764.2) Under the EAR, violations may result in severe both criminal and civil/criminal
penalties, including imprisonment of company directors, officers and employees, and substantial fines. The potential
penalties for “knowing violations” include imprisonment of up to five years, and fines of up to $50,000 or five times
the value of the exports involved, whichever is greater. On the contrary, the potential penalties for each “willful
violation” by an individual range from fines of up to $250,000 to imprisonment of up to ten years, or both. For
companies, the penalty for each violation may be up to $1 million or up to five times the value of the exports
involved, whichever is greater. The EAR also provides for a series of administrative sanctions including revocation
of export licenses held by the violator, general denial of the violator’s export privileges, exclusion of the exporter
from export transactions, and the imposition of fines for each violation. 15 C.F.R. �764.3(a) & (b).
90) 15 C.F.R. �734.3(a).
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